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LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES SURVEY

INTRODUCTION

This Survey focuses on recent cases affecting oil and gas and public
lands. Part I demonstrates how contractual agreements govern relationships in the oil and gas arena. This section explores how courts may either
take an active role in interpreting such agreements by ignoring the express language to reach an equitable result, or the courts may allow the
contracting parties to allocate risk and define the nature of the agreement. In Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit unconvincingly determined that a gas market sharing provision in a unit operating agreement was ambiguous,
thereby enabling the court to equitably distribute proceeds from the sale
of production. In Reese Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 2 the
Tenth Circuit relied on the language in the assignment agreements to determine whether a gas owner was negligent for damage caused by escaping
gas. In Reese, the court allowed the oil and gas parties entering a contractual agreement to define their relationship, while in Amoco the court took
an active role in establishing the parties' relationship.
Part II focuses on public lands. This section discusses public participation in Bureau of Land Management (BLM) planning pursuant to the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. 3 In National Parks &
ConservationAss'n v. Federal Aviation Administration,4 the Tenth Circuit correctly held that the Bureau of Land Management failed to meet its statutory obligation of providing adequate public notice prior to conveying
lands that had been previously designated by the BLM as Areas of Critical
Environmental Concern. Although the court sent a powerful message to
the BLM regarding the necessity of public participation, its ruling had little effect on the situation at hand because the court had previously ignored a request for an injunction preventing the conveyance.
I.

A.

OIL AND GAS

Interpreting "Ambiguous" Agreements to Equitably Balance Gas Proceeds:
5
Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp.
1.

Background

In oil and gas production, unitization refers to combining leases and
wells in order to maintain pressure or to aid secondary or tertiary recovery
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

7 F.3d 909 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 1507 (1994).
983 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1993).
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988).
998 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1993).
7 F.3d 909 (10th Cir. 1993).
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operations. 6 The unitized development of reservoirs has been advocated
since the early 1900's. 7 Prior to unitization, production attempts centered
around maximizing the amount of drilling occurring within a given field. 8
However, dissipation of the natural pressure in reservoirs caused by overdrilling left large amounts of oil in the formation. 9 The concepts of communitization, pooling, and unitization arose, in part, to remedy this problem. 10 Although the effect of these concepts is similar,1 1 unitization is
"the most satisfactory cooperative plan from the standpoint of maximizing
12
a yield from an entire producing formation."
A plan of unitization is generally effectuated by two separate instruments: the unit agreement and the unit operating agreement.' 3 A unit
agreement is defined as an agreement "of development and operation for
the recovery of oil and gas... as a single consolidated unit without regard
to separate ownerships and for the allocation of costs and benefits on a
basis as defined in the agreement or plan."1 4 More specifically, the unit
agreement defines the areal limits, creates the unit, designates the unit
operator, and determines the participation formula to distribute produc6. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW, 220-21 (1983). Secondary recovery is a method of
recovery in which extraneous energy sources, such as liquids or gas, are employed to move
the hydrocarbons through the reservoir or to extract the product. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS &
CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMS 798 (6th ed. 1984) [hereinafterTERMS].

Tertiary recovery is an enhanced method of recovery of crude oil or natural gas in which
chemicals or energy are employed to assist in the recovery process. Id. at 900.
7. Bruce M. Kramer, "Unit Agreements - Historical Perspective and Theoretical Underpinnings," Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Pooling and UnitizationII, Paper No. 4, 4-2 (Rocky Mtn.
Min. L. Fdn. 1990).
8. See Philip G. Dufford, "Summary of Comments Relative to an Introduction to Pooling and Unitization," Institute on Poolingand Unitization of Oil and Gas Interests, Paper No. 1, 1-7
to 1-8 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1980). The desire to maximize production and its subsequent negative effects were largely caused by the early adoption of the rule of capture. See 1
BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H.

MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 2.02 (3d

ed. 1992). The rule of capture created substantial problems for efficient development of oil
and gas. Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-3. See also infra part II.
9. Dufford, supra note 8, at 1-8. See also KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 8, § 2.03 ("the
amount of hydrocarbons that are left underground as the result of primary production techniques may be substantial").
10. Dufford, supra note 8, at 1-9 to 1-10. Communitization, or the communitized lease,
allows owners of small tracts of land to execute a common lease with the understanding that
a well drilled anywhere within the area will benefit all the owners proportionally to the
amount of land contributed. See id. Pooling also refers to the combining of ownerships, but
applies to lessees as well as lessors. Id. at 1-10. Pooling developed to maximize the spacing of
wells to most efficiently drain an area. Id. Cf TERMS, supra note 6, at 140, 652 (indicating
that communitization and pooling are synonyms). The terms unitization and pooling are
used synonymously. LowE, supra note 6, at 220.
11. Compare Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-6 to 4-7 (unitization eliminates the internal property lines within the unit area so that the wells can be drilled where they most effectively
drain the reservoir) with Dufford, supra note 8, at 1-10 (pooling maximizes the spacing of wells
to most effectively drain a given area).
12. Dufford, supra note 8, at 1-10. There are two primary types of unitized operations:
developmental and operational. Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-2. The developmental unit is
formed to permit rapid and systematic field development. TERMS, supra note 6, at 218. The
operational unit deals with a mature field or reservoir, typically created in order to implement secondary or tertiary recovery. Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-2.
13. Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-1.
14. TERMS, supra note 6, at 936.
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tion. 15 The unit agreement
typically includes all interest owners: mineral,
16
leasehold, and royalty.
Although some of its functions overlap, the unit operating agreement
is generally more limited in its focus than the unit agreement in that it
defines the relationships among the working interest owners. In other
words, a unit operating agreement is concerned with the "parties sharing
the costs of unit development, typically the leasehold and unleased mineral owners."1 7 The unit operating agreement also governs the allocations
of funds derived from the sale of the production.' 8
Although standard forms of these agreements are available, t 9 every
unitization is unique. Therefore, the parties must exercise "substantial
care . . .in the drafting of provisions appropriate for the particular situa-

tion." 20 Unit agreements and unit operating agreements are exceedingly
complex because of the high possibility of unforeseeable future conflicts. 2 ' The parties must adequately address various issues in the agree-

ment to avoid future problems, including: 22 the allocation of production
among the premises included in the unit;2 3 the allocation of drilling and
other costs; 24 payment of shut-in royalties to lessors; 25 problems arising

26
from the creation of units applicable only to specified minerals or strata;

15. Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-1.
16. Id.
17. Id. Although an instrument may be termed an "operating agreement," it may not be
limited to controlling the actual operation of producing wells. The agreement may encompass the exploration and exploitation as well as the production and abandonment phases.
Thomas P. Schroedter & Lewis G. Mosburg, Jr., "An Introduction to the AAPL Model Form
Operating Agreement," The Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreement, Paper No. 1, 1-1 (Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1990).
18. Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., No. C86-0172-B, at 2 (D. Wyo. July 30,
1990) (findings of fact and conclusions of law).
19. For a sample unit agreement, see 7 HowARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLESJ. MEYERS, OIL
AND GAS LAw § 920.1-2 (1993). For a sample unit operating agreement, see Federal Onshore
Oil and Gas Pooling and Unitization II, 195-a (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1990); 3 KRAMER &
MARTIN, supra note 8, § 29.02.
See alsoJoe 0. Young, "Non-Federal Operating Agreements," Institute on Pooling and Unitization of Oil and Gas Interests, Paper No. 9, 9-1 to 9-4 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1980)
(describing the intended and preferred uses for various forms of unit operating agreements,
mining joint operating agreements, and offshore operating agreements).
20. 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, § 920. See also id.
at §§ 921 - 921.19 (discussing
customary provisions of pooling and unitization agreements).
21. The risk of potential conflicts is reduced by the fact that the parties generally engage
in protracted negotiations in creating unitization agreements. See id. § 924 (describing the
various stages occurring in agreement negotiations).
22. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the issues and problems that
should be addressed in unit and unit operating agreements. Agreement negotiations may
take years. Id. See also Young, supra note 19, at 9-7 to 9-13 (discussing problems either created or not resolved by the A.A.P.L. form 610-Model Form Operating Agreement).
23. 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, § 970.
24. Id. § 972.
25. See id. § 982. A shut-in royalty clause in an oil and gas lease allows the lessee to make
payments to the lessor to keep the lease alive when a well has been drilled which is capable of
producing "in paying quantities," but the gas is not being marketed. See TERMS, supra note 6,
at 818.
26. 6 Williams & Meyers, supra note 19, §§ 973 - 974.4.
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alteration in unit boundaries;2 8 and the fiduciary

29
duties of the unit operator and other parties.
In addition, parties to a unit operating agreement may attempt to
predict future gas balancing 30 problems or inequities in gas sales by including a gas balancing agreement or other provisions within the unit operating agreement that address possible future gas inequities. 3 1 The
inclusion of such provisions make the unit operating agreement (and the
task of negotiating it) much more complex.3 2 Generally, gas balancing
problems arise when working interest owners fail to take gas in proportion
to their ownership interest, thereby leaving parties either over or underproduced. 33 Gas balancing problems may also arise when one party enters
34
a gas sales contract and the other parties do not.

The reasons for disproportionate gas production or sales are as numerous as the situations in which they occur.3 5 The methods by which
parties choose to balance also vary greatly.3 6 Therefore, provisions ad27. Id. § 980.3.
28. Id. § 980.2.
29. Id. § 991.
30. Gas balancing is "[t]he process by which persons having an interest in production
from a well, unit or reservoir adjust their take therefrom to ensure that each such person
receives his proportionate part of production." TERMS, supra note 6, at 62.
31. See Ernest E. Smith, "Relationships Between Co-Owners in Marketing Natural Gas,"
Institute on Natural Gas Marketing, Paper No. 11, 11-1 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1987) ("The
operating agreement may, or may not, contain a gas balancing agreement as an attachment,
and either its presence or its absence may create problems of interpretation relative to the
producer's right to sell the gas.").
See also Bert L. Campbell, "Gas Balancing Agreements," Institute on Oil and Gas Agreements, Paper No. 9, 9-4 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1983) (noting that balancing was accomplished for years without written agreements). Working interest owners have elected to
proceed without gas balancing agreements due to uncertainty in meaning or result. Id. at 95.
32. "The difficulty experienced in negotiating balancing agreements is evidenced by the
fact that many oil balancing agreements provide that the parties agree to agree on a balancing agreement for gas if and when commercial production of gas is obtained, thus postponing to a later day the complex negotiating process." 8 WILAMS & MYasS, OIL AND GAS
TERMS 85 (citing Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 898 F.2d 1064, 1065 (5th Cir.
1990)).
33. Ezekiel J. Williams, Land and Natural Resources Survey, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 811, 812
(1993). A party is "underproduced" if it does not sell its share of production. Id. Conversely,
overproduced parties have taken more than their share. Id.
34. See KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 8, § 19.05. The question then becomes whether
the party with the sales contract must account to the other parties for their proportionate
share of production. Id. This was the question put to the court in Amoco. See infra part I.B.
35. See Campbell, supranote 31, at 9-1 to 9-3 (providing extensive examples of situations
in which gas balancing disputes may arise).
36. Courts recognize three methods for balancing: (1) balancing in kind requires the
underproduced party to take a percentage of the overproduced party's gas until the imbalance has been made up; (2) periodic cash balancingrequires that the underproduced party
receive cash from the overproducer, curing the imbalance immediately; (3) cash balancing
upon reservoirdepletion occurs when balancing in kind is unavailable because the reservoir has
been depleted; therefore, the overproduced party compensates the underproduced party
with cash. Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
Absent an agreement on the method of balancing, courts generally prefer balancing "in
kind" to remedy gas balancing problems. See, e.g., Pogo Producing Co., 898 F.2d at 1065-66
(explaining that industry usage and custom require balancing in kind to remedy underproduction); Doheny v. Wexpro Co., 974 F.2d 130, 133-34 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that unless
conditions suggest otherwise, balancing in kind is the preferred remedy to correct gas pro-
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dressing gas production or sales inequities in unit operating agreements
cannot address all of the issues and resolve all of the conflicts that may
arise among co-owners as a result of natural gas production and sales.
2.

Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp.

In Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp.,3 7 the Tenth Circuit held that
an ambiguous gas market sharing provision in a unit operating agreement
required a party to the agreement to share with the other working interest
owners its proceeds from gas sales and its settlement of a take-or-pay contract dispute with a gas purchaser.
a. Facts
The Anschutz Corporation (Anschutz) appealed the district court's
judgment3 8 ordering it to pay over $29 million to Amoco Rocmount Com40
pany (Amoco) 39 and other working interest owners (collectively WIOs),
for breaching a unit operating agreement. 4 1 The controversy underlying
the litigation stemmed from the 1979 discovery of a reservoir known as the
Anschutz Ranch East Unit (AREU).42 The WIOs of the AREU negotiated
a unit operating agreement (UOA) for the field. The UOA contained the
controverted provision regarding future gas sales. Section 5.11 of the
UOA, entitled Inability to Market All Gas, read in part:
If at any time a Party's share of the gas available for sale exceeds
the quantity of gas such Party's gas purchaser will take (excess
gas), then every other Party, if requested to do so by the Party
owning such excess gas, shall be obligated
to share its market for
43
gas with the Party owning such excess.
Prior to 1979, Anschutz entered into a long-term, take-or-pay natural
gas sales contract 44 with Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America
(NGPL), which encompassed the area in which AREU was subsequently
duction imbalances in the absence of a formal gas balancing agreement); Williams, supra
note 33, at 816 (discussing the types of balancing available and providing an analysis of the
Doheny ruling).
37. 7 F.3d 909 (10th Cir. 1993).
38. Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., No. C86-0172-B (D. Wyo. July 30, 1990).
39. Amoco also appealed the district court's judgment awarding damages to Anschutz
for $4,940,585.03 for indemnifaction of attorney's fees for the Anschutz-NGPL suit and for
breaching its duty as unit operator to notify the working interest owners prior to making
substantial changes in the basic method of operation. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 913, 920.
40. A working interest is "[t ] he operating interest under an oil and gas lease. The owner
of the working interest has the exclusive right to exploit the minerals on the land." TERms,
supra note 6, at 979. The WIOs of a unitized area are entitled to pro rata shares in the oil and
gas produced from the field. See Amoco Rocmunt, No. C86-0172-B, at 2 (findings of fact and
conclusions of law).
See also LowE, supra note 6, at 388 (a working interest is "[t]he rights to the mineral
interest granted by an oil and gas lease, so-called because the lessee acquires the right to
work on the leased property to search, develop and produce oil and gas." The right is coupled with an obligation to pay all costs).
41. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 913.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. In a take-or-pay contract, the "purchaser agrees to take a minimum quantity of...
gas over a specified term at a fixed price.., or to make minimum periodic payments to the
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discovered. 45 Anschutz assigned one-half of its interest in the AREU to
Mobil Rocky Mountain, Inc. (Mobil), including a share of the contract
with NGPL. In 1985, however, NGPL curtailed its AREU gas purchases
and filed suit against Anschutz and Mobil to relieve itself of its obligations
under the take-or-pay contract because natural gas prices were plummet47
ing. 46 These disputes were settled out of court.
Amoco and the other Wits did not enter into long-term gas sales
contracts during this period; however, all the WiO's had gas sales contracts, and all but one sold some gas. The gas Anschutz sold to NGPL
48
equaled only its working interest owner's share of gas available for sale.
In 1986, Amoco and the other Wits (collectively Amoco) sued Anschutz, claiming that according to section 5.11 of the UOA, Anschutz was
obligated to share the proceeds of its sales to NGPL. 49 Amoco also
claimed that under section 5.11, it was entitled to a share of the settlement
money Anschutz received from NGPL for breaching the take-or-pay contract. 50 In addition, because Mobil had purchased an interest in the
AREU and part of the NGPL contract from Anschutz, Amoco sued Mobil
for the same market sharing benefits from its gas sales to NGPL. 51 Amoco
and Mobil settled the dispute. Although Mobil was uncertain about the
meaning or application of section 5.11, the amount on which the parties
52
settled was consistent with Amoco's interpretation of the section.
Anschutz argued that section 5.11 was not applicable because Amoco
did not have the requisite gas purchaser and did not make the required
request. According to Anschutz, section 5.11 provided a method for shortterm cash balancing that would take effect only when one party's pur53
chaser was unable to take all of that party's gas.
b.

District Court

The district court held that section 5.11 required Anschutz to share
the proceeds of its natural gas sales with the other WIOs. 54 In reaching its
conclusion, the court determined that the term "excess gas" was ambiguproducer even though (the) ...gas is not being delivered to the purchaser." TERMS, supra
note 6, at 883.
45. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 914.
46. Id. In 1980, the average wellhead gas price in Wyoming and Utah was $1.78 per one
thousand cubic feet (mcf). In 1981, it was $2.47 per mcf; $3.19 in 1982; and $3.41 in early
1984. Upon deregulation, the prices fell in 1985. By 1986, prices were down to $2.59 per
mcf. Amoco Rocmount, No. C86-0172-B at 6.
See also David W. Wilson, "What is Happening to our Natural Gas Markets?" Natural Gas
Marketing, Paper No. 13 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1987) (explaining that the deteriorating
natural gas market was caused, in part, by a drop in demand, competition from an overbuilt
electrical generating capacity, and a non-responsive regulatory structure).
47. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 914.
48. Amoco Rocmount, No. C86-0172-B at 8-9.
49. Amoco Rocmount v. Anschutz Corp., No. C86-0172-B (D. Wyo. July 30, 1990).
50. Amoco Rocmoun 7 F.3d at 914.
51. Id. at 919.
52. Id. at 920.
53. Amoco Rocmount, No. C86-0172-B at 4.
54. Id. at 28.
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ous. 55 Therefore, the court admitted extrinsic evidence regarding the
parties' intent. The evidence included testimony and memoranda from
representatives of the Wits, the parties' post-agreement conduct, and the
settlement between Amoco and Mobil.
The court agreed with Anschutz that the section provided for cash
balancing, but disagreed when it took effect. The court observed that
although in kind balancing is the preferred remedy, equity or special circumstances may compel a court to cash balance. 56 A court must also allow
cash balancing if the agreement between the parties provides for cash balancing. The court concluded that "the agreement here, although ambiguous, clearly provides for cash balancing." 57 The court explained that the
Wits rejected in kind balancing because the gas recovery process required nitrogen injection which would decrease the quality of the gas and
increase the cost of processing the gas, thus making balancing in kind
58
inequitable.
The court also found that the parties' post-agreement conduct "overwhelmingly" indicated that all parties intended the section to be a market
sharing provision without a gas purchaser prerequisite. 59 The specific
conduct the court relied on included the following facts: Amoco paid an60
nual royalties and taxes on the revenue it expected from the NGPL sales;
a 1985 letter from Anschutz's vice president proposed to make payments
to Amoco for distribution among the WIG as "a resolution to the WiG's
differences";6 1 reports prepared for Anschutz by Scientific Software Corporation prior to 1985 referred to the "gas contract sharing agreement"
and thereafter referred to the "gas contract sharing agreement which has
now been discontinued"; 62 and a complaint Anschutz filed against NGPL
that stated that it had obtained an interest in and expected in the future to
obtain interests in natural gas not taken from the Unit by the other
Wits. 63 In addition, several of the WIts were marketing for one another
64
and sharing sales revenues.
Finally, the court held that Anschutz's interpretation was unreasonable. The court could find "no reasonable explanation for why the parties
55. "Excess gas," the court reasoned, could mean any gas left after a purchaser had
taken some or any amount of gas unsold. Id. at 10.
56. Id. at 21-24. The cases on which the court based its gas balancing discussion included: Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshored, Inc., 898 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1990); Chevron
v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 755 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985); United Petroleum Exploration v.
Premier Resources, 511 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Marr, No. 89-

0846 (E.D. La. Jan. 5,1990).
57. Amoco Rocmount, No. C86-0172-B at 24.

58. I.
59. Id. at 25.
60. Id. at 26. Amoco's income projections, however, did not mention market sharing
revenues. Id. at 12.
61. Id. at 26. The court assumed that this "proposal could not have been made if Anschutz had not recognized an obligation to share its market under § 5.11." Id. at 13.
62. Id. at 26. The information used by Scientific Software was provided entirely by An-

schutz. Id. at 14.
63. Id. at 14, 26.
64. See d. at 12-13.
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would have intended to require a gas purchaser before the market sharing
provisions would go into effect."

65

On appeal, Anschutz argued that the district court incorrectly: 1) determined that 5.11 was ambiguous; 2) held that 5.11 did not require a gas
purchaser; and 3) admitted evidence regarding the settlement between
66
Mobil and Amoco.
c.

Tenth Circuit Opinion

After assuming jurisdiction, 67 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district
court's interpretation of section 5.11 requiring Anschutz to share its gas
market and settlement proceeds with Amoco and the other WIOs. The
Tenth Circuit explained that the district court had correctly found section
5.11 to be ambiguous

68

and that the district court's extensive findings of

fact regarding the parties' intent were not clearly erroneous. Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit could not overturn the district court's holding regarding the meaning of the section. 69 In addition, the Tenth Circuit held that
the trial court's admission of the settlement agreement between Mobil and
Amoco was not an abuse of discretion due to the low threshold for
70
relevancy.
3.

Analysis

Given the complex nature of gas balancing and unit operating agreements, it is unlikely that parties will foresee and adequately address all
potential problems. The parties' failure in Amoco to clearly define section
5.11 of the unit operating agreement resulted in a difficult, $29 million
65. Id. at 26.
66. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 917. Anschutz argued in the alternative that if section 5.11
did require them to share, they were only required to do so for one year. The court found
that the one year limitation was included in the section so that the market sharing would not
result in the unit being taxed as a corporation. Id. at 919. See alsoYoung, supra note 19, at 911 to 9-12 (explaining difficulties with express provisions in operating agreements that attempt to affect state and federal taxation).
67. The court asserted its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1) (diversity) despite
Anschutz' challenge. Anschutz argued: 1) that its principal place of business as well as
Amoco's was in Colorado, therefore no diversity existed between them; and 2) Amoco violated the 28 U.S.C. § 1359 prohibition against the collusive manufacture of federal jurisdiction by agreeing with the other WIOs that they would not join the suit against Anschutz so as
not to destroy diversity. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 914.
In rejecting the firstjurisdictional challenge, the court explicitly adopted the "total activity" test to determine that Amoco's principal place of business was not Colorado while Anschutz' was. Id. at 915-16. The court then determined that a litigation agreement between
Amoco and the other WIOs limiting the involvement of the later in the suit against Anschutz
did not constitute improper collusion under 28 U.S.C. § 1359. Amoco, as the unit operator,
would normally conduct business, including litigation, on behalf of and for the benefit of the
WIO's. Id. at 916.
68. Id. at 918.
69. Id. at 919. Under Colorado law, findings of fact must be accepted by the appellate
court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 918. The Tenth Circuit did admit that ascertaining the parties' intent was a difficult task in this case: "we cannot find clearly erroneous
the district court's conclusion that the intent of the parties, to the extent it can be ascertainedat
al, was that they were not required to have a gas purchaser before invoking the market
sharing provisions of § 5.11. " Id. at 919 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 919-20.

1994]

LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES

1025

judicial decision. In adopting Amoco's interpretation of section 5.11, the
district court and the Tenth Circuit managed to ensure an equitable distribution of the gas production proceeds. However, to achieve this end, the
district court unconvincingly determined that the section was ambiguous,
thereby allowing the court to examine extrinsic evidence regarding the
parties' intent.
A court may only investigate the parties' intent through extrinsic evidence if the language of the agreement or provision is ambiguous. To
support its conclusion that the section was ambiguous, the Tenth Circuit
asserted well-known axioms of contractual interpretation: "[t] he meaning
of a contract is found by examination of the entire instrument and not by
viewing clauses or phrases in isolation"; "[e]ach word is to be given meaning if at all possible"; 71 and " [t] o ascertain whether a provision is ambiguous, the court must examine and construe the language in harmony with
the plain, popular, and generally accepted meaning of the words employed and with reference to all provisions of the document."72 Although
the court asserted these propositions, it did not apply them.
a.

The "Ambiguous" Word Defined

First, the lower court held, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that the
term "excess gas" was ambiguous. The trial court explained that it could
mean either the quantity of gas remaining after a purchaser had taken
some gas or any quantity of unsold gas. 73 This is a reasonable explanation
only if the term is analyzed separately from the provision in which it is
found. However, section 5.11 solves the dilemma of the meaning of the
term by explicitly defining "excess gas" as a quantity of gas that exceeds
the quantity such party's purchaser will take.
b.

Each Word Given Meaning

The courts' interpretation of section 5.11 rendered the term "gas purchaser" meaningless. The Tenth Circuit pointed out that "[n]owhere else
in the contract is a requirement for a gas purchaser mentioned," thereby
leaving the court without another reference to the term to examine. 74 It
is unlikely that the parties intended to ignore the term. Because "gas purchaser" is mentioned only in section 5.11, the Tenth Circuit should have
given it import.
c.

Examination of the Entire Instrument

An examination of the entire instrument shows that the two provisions of the UOA directly preceding section 5.11 are concerned with tak71. Id. at 917 (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc.,
842 P.2d 208, 213 (Colo. 1992) (emphasis in original)).
72. Id. (quoting Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 831 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. 1992)).
73. Amoco Rocmoun4 No. C86-0172-B at 10.
74. Amoco Rocmount, 7 F.3d at 919.
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ing in kind. 75 Section 5.9, entitled "Taking in Kind," sets forth a general
proposition that "[e] ach party shall currently, as produced, take in kind or
separately dispose of its share of Allocable United Substances .... Except
as otherwise provided in Section 5.10 or 5.11 each Party shall be entitled
to receive directly all proceeds from the sale of its share of United Sub76
stances sold."
Apparently, section 5.10 acts as the first exception to section 5.9. Section 5.10, entitled "Failure to Take in Kind," contemplates the situation in
which a party may "fail to take in kind or separately dispose of its share" of
production. 77 Under such circumstances, a party may purchase the share
or shares not taken. 78 The second exception to 5.9, the controverted 5.11,
contemplates a situation in which a party's gas purchaser will not take all
of that party's gas. Under this isolated situation, the parties agreed on
balancing in cash. 79 The district court, however, found that the "agreement" rejected balancing in kind and intended to balance in cash.80 This
statement, however, is inaccurate if the document is viewed in its entirety
and if any meaning is to be given to the immediately preceding sections.
Section 5.9 clearly provides for balancing in kind as the parties' desired
remedy for imbalances. 8 '
Although the district court used a questionable method in reaching
its holding, the Tenth Circuit was not compelled to overturn the ruling
because the result was equitable. Under the unit and unit operating
agreements, each party contributes to the costs of extracting the production, and therefore should reap rewards in proportion to contribution.
The operating agreement embodies the WIOs' commitment to work together toward a common goal of production profit. A "partnership" is
formed in which, at a minimum, fair dealing is owed one another. "A sort
of team spirit or esprit de corps permeates the operating agreement by the
fashion in which the parties put their trust in one another to carry out the
75.

July 30,
Area).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Brief for Appellant, Amoco Rocmount v. Anschutz Corp., No. C86-0172-B (D. Wyo.

1990) (Appendix: Unit Operating Agreement for the Anschutz Ranch East Unit
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 56-58.

81. Arguably, none of these provisions addressed the situation at hand, in which a party
was without a gas purchaser and wished to share another WIO's market for gas.

An unattractive effect of the court's decision was to reward Amoco's risky business decision to wait to sell until prices were higher and punish Anschutz for diligently marketing its
share of production. In retrospect, Amoco was able to "hold out" at no risk.
Interpreting § 5.11 as the court did also provides incentive for WIOs without purchasers
to rely on proceeds from parties with purchasers rather than to secure or attempt to secure
purchasers of their own. Parties to the agreement may avoid this result by including a statement requiring all parties to put forth a good faith effort to obtain purchasers, unless such
requirement is implicitly imposed upon the parties.
In some jurisdictions, a lessee has an implied duty to diligently search for a market in
which to sell produced gas. Tucker v. Hugoton Energy Corp., 855 P.2d 929, 936 (Kan. 1993)
(explaining that the payment of shut-in gas royalties does not excuse the lessee from its duty
to search for a market). It may be argued that a similar duty is imposed on a WIO.
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goals of the agreement."8 2 As members of the "joint venture," Wits reasonably expect to share the fruits of the labor as well as the costs.
B.

PrivateAgreements Governing Common Law Negligence: Reese
83
Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co.
1. Background

Generally, minerals are considered real property and therefore subject to the rules of real estate law. The law governing oil and gas ownership, however, differs substantially from the law governing solid mineral
ownership because of the peculiar nature of oil and gas. 84 In the early
stages of the development of oil and natural gas law, courts understandably analogized these minerals to wild animals (ferae naturae) because of
their migratory propensities and a limited scientific knowledge regarding
the nature of the minerals. 85 As a result, the law of capture, 86 which gov87
erned ownership of wild animals, was applied to oil and gas.
82. Milam Randolph Pharo, "Duties and Obligations Revisited - Who Bears What Risk
of Loss?," The Oil and Gas Joint OperatingAgreement, Paper No. 4, 4-2 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn.
1990).
83. 983 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1993). During the Survey period, the Tenth Circuit
decided several other oil and gas cases: Octagon Gas Sys. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir.
1993) (holding that the owner of a "perpetual overriding royalty interest" in proceeds from
the sale of natural gas through Chapter 11 had an enforceable interest in debtor's gas sale
proceeds, that the owner's interest constituted an "account" subject to Article 9 of the UCC,
and that the account was an estate property despite prior assignment of the account);
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 986 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that a suit
brought by a gas pipeline owner to review FERC's order requiring the owner to amend
downward a take-or-pay surcharge to customers was not ripe for judicial review); Lone
Mountain Production Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 984 F.2d 1551 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a pipeline company was estopped from demanding strict compliance with the
assignment provision of a gas purchase contract and damages awarded to the well operator
were properly based on estimates of preflow production); Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Leben
Oil Corp., 976 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a working interest owner's action for
accounting was time barred and that the interest holder did not produce the requisite
evidence of a balance due as required to obtain an accounting).
84. 1 EUGENE KuNTz, OIL AND GAS § 2.2 (1987). The law pertaining to oil and gas is
generally the same. The gaseous character of natural gas, however, necessitates methods of
handling different from those used in oil production. Id. § 1.19.
85. Gas, usually present with oil, has the capacity to expand when the pressure within
the formation is reduced. Phillip Wm.Lear, "Conservation Principles and Federal Onshore
Pooling and Unitization: An Overview," Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Pooling and Unitization II,
Paper No. 1, 3 (Rocky Mm. Min. L. Fnd. 1990) (quoting Professor Philip Dufford on the
physical characteristics of petroleum).
The rapidity and facility with which the migration of oil takes place depends upon: the
hydrostatic pressure, character of the formation, dip of the strata, and nature of the oil.
KuN-rz, supra note 84, § 1.21.
86. The "law of capture" is used interchangeably with the "rule of capture." It also has
been referred to as the "law of piracy" or the "law of the jungle." Robert E. Hardwicke, The
Rule of Capture and its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REv. 391, 392 (1935)
(deemed as such because it authorizes the taking of another person's property).
87. See, e.g., Bezzi v. Hocker, 370 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1966); Anderson v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 699 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1985); Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75
S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934). Cf Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 450 F.Supp. 412 (E.D. Okla.
1978), affd, 609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 964 (1980); White v. New
York State Natural Gas Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Pa. 1960); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
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The law of capture embodies a simple concept of ownership; whoever
captures it owns it, regardless of where it was located.88 Furthermore, if it
escapes it is no longer owned and therefore obtainable by anyone. 89
Although the underlying concept of this rule is simple, many problems
resulted from its application to oil and gas. In oil production, the law of
capture promotes overdrilling which causes dissipation of reservoir energy
and results in substantial waste through nonrecovery. 90 The doctrine was
also unsuccessful when applied to natural gas, particularly when gas storage became a necessity. 9 '
The primary problems resulting from the application of the law of
capture to natural gas centered around determining ownership and liability for damage. Strict adherence to the law of capture meant gas injectors
would not retain title to the natural gas that they stored in underground
formations, and other parties, such as mineral owners or adjacent land
owners, were able to obtain ownership. 92 Furthermore, if the injectors did
not retain title to natural gas injected into formations for storage, it was
not clear who was liable to the mineral or surface owners for damage
93
caused by the gas.

For an excellent critique on the evolution and application of the rule of capture and the
hardships it created for the oil and gas industry see Hardwicke, supra note 86. In 1935, when
Hardwicke's article was published, all states recognized the rule of capture. Id. at 403.
88. Under traditional oil and gas jurisprudence the Rule of Capture determines the
owner of the oil and gas. In simple terms the Rule assigns ownership to a party who
captures or controls the hydrocarbons by bringing it to the surface, regardless of
where the hydrocarbons may have been located underground.
Kramer, supra note 7, at 4-6.
89. See Mullett v. Bradley, 53 N.Y.S. 781, 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898) (noting that the
owner loses the property interest in an animal that returns to the wild).
90. Lear, supra note 85, at 1-7.
91. The nation's demand for natural gas increased during the past twenty years due to a
change in social concerns regarding energy consumption. However, an inefficient gas transport system that provided more gas than needed in the summer months and less than
needed in winter months gave rise to the need for an efficient method for storing gas. Fred
McGaha, Symposium, Underground Gas Storage: Opposing Rights and Interest, 46 LA. L. REv. 871,
871 (1986). The surplus gas is often transported into underground storage reservoirs. Id.
92. Id. at 879. Cf Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948, 954 (10th Cir. 1993)
(once extracted, natural gas becomes personal property in Oklahoma). The inequity of the
rule's result is obvious, considering that the gas owner likely paid for the right to extract the
gas and for its production or purchased the gas from a producer and then purchased the
storage rights.
93. See Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. App. 1934)
(holding that injected gas becomes ferae naturae and is no longer owned by the injector,
therefore the injector is not required to pay a landowner for use of the subsurface strata
when the gas strays into it). Cf Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 450 F. Supp. 412 (E.D.
Okla. 1978), afd, 609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 964 (1980) (ownership
of injected gas is not lost upon injection when it does not mix with native gas and the boundaries of the reservoir are capable of determination); White v. New York State Natural Gas
Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (gas storage company could recover from those
producing their injected gas from a neighboring well under the theory of conversion upon
proving that it was their gas being produced); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d
870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (ownership of injected gas is not lost).
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Problems such as these, resulting from the rule of capture, greatly
curtailed the rule's application to oil and gas. 9 4 Several states have explicitly precluded application of the rule to stored gas. 9 5 It is now generally
accepted that the ownership of gas is not lost upon injection. 96 However,
this does not necessarily mean that the injectors will be held responsible
for damages caused by storing the gas and its subsequent movement or
97
escape.
2.

Reese Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co

In Reese Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co.,9 8 the Tenth Circuit looked to the language in the assignment of mineral interests to determine whether a gas owner was liable to an oil producer for damages
caused by escaping gas. In doing so, the Court refused to apply Kansas's
vestige of the rule of capture.
a. Facts
The controversy in Reese arose out of a conflict between two oil and
gas lease owners in Colony-Welda Field in Anderson County, Kansas. Williams Natural Gas Company (WNG) obtained9 9 gas storage rights in the
94. See Lear, supra note 85, at 1-8. Waste in oil production due to non-recovery has also
been curtailed by the evolution of communitization and unitization as well as secondary and
tertiary recovery techniques. See supra part IA.
95. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:22(D) (1985); OaLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 52, § 36.6 (1992 &
Supp. 1994); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.182 (West 1993). See also BRUCE M. KRAMER &
PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 2.02 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp.
1992).
96. McGaha, supra note 91, at 883 (excepting when the gas can no longer be identified).
Cf Anderson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 699 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1985) (holding that ownership
rights were lost when gas was reinjected, but limiting the holding to situations where natural
gas public utilities are not involved, and the injector did not obtain permission from the
authorized commission or from the adjoining land owner). Also, parties may still argue that
the doctrine, in certain circumstances, applies or should apply to natural gas stored or escaping from the underground reservoirs. See Reese v. Williams Natural Gas, 983 F.2d 1514, 1517
(10th Cir. 1993) (petitioner arguing that escaped natural gas was common property under
Kansas law).
97. The theory that substances with migrating propensities may be injected into a formation even if the injection results in the displacement of more valuable substances is known as
the "negative" rule of capture. According to this theory, the injector will not be liable for
damages if pursued as part of a reasonable program of development and without injury to
the producing formation. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERs, OIL AND GAS LAw § 204.5 (1993). Cf Young
v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979) (allowing
recovery under a theory of nuisance for damages caused by the injection of salt water); Jameson v. Ethyl Corp., 609 S.W.2d 346 (Ark. 1980) (holding injector liable when secondary recovery processes depletes minerals from or causes special damage to adjoining lands).
Note that the "negative rule of capture" is generally not applied to the injection of gas
for storage purposes. McGaha, supra note 91, at 883-84.
98. Reese, 983 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1993).
99. The leases at issue in this case were assigned to W.S. Fees in 1936 and 1937 and
entitled Fees to oil, gas, and gas storage rights on the land. Fees conveyed all "the gas and
gas rights ... and all gas storage rights" to Cities Service Gas which was WNG's predecessor in
interest. Cities Service Gas began injecting and storing gas in the field in the late 1930's. Id.
at 1517.
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field up to a depth of 1,050 feet. 100 WNG was injecting gas into and withdrawing it from the Bartlesville formation, located at 900 feet in depth.' 0 1
Reese Exploration Incorporated (Reese) owned the right to produce
oil from the same land that WNG was using to store gas. 10 2 Specifically,
Reese was attempting to recover oil from the Squirrel formation located at
800 feet, just above the Bartlesville formation.
Reese alleged that WNG was negligently permitting its injected gas to
escape and enter the Squirrel sand formation, thereby inhibiting Reese's
oil recovery operations. Reese sought compensatory damages and injunctive relief ordering WNG to lower its storage zone pressure. 10 3 Reese also
04
argued that the escaped gas was common property under Kansas law.'
Therefore, Reese requested declaratory relief recognizing its ownership of
10 5
the migrated gas.
WNG responded that its lease conferred the right to store gas up to
1,050 feet below the surface and that Reese's oil rights were subject to
10 6
WNG's gas storage rights; therefore, it did not owe Reese a duty.
b.

District Court

The district court found that WNG's storage rights were limited to the
Bartlesville formation. 10 7 Thus, WNG was liable for the damage caused to
Reese by the escaping gas.' 08 The court reasoned that the parties had "coexisting rights to produce oil and store gas," neither of which was superior,
so neither party should interfere with the other's exercise of its rights
100. Id. Fees was both the surface and mineral owner at the time he conveyed gas storage
rights to WNG's predecessor. See McGaha, supra note 91, at 872-73. (discussing which interest owner may lease or assign storage rights).
101. Reese, 983 F.2d at 1516.
102. In 1979, Fees' trustee assigned all Fees' remaining rights to Charles Hardesty who
assigned them to We-Kan Resources, Inc., who in turn assigned them to Reese. Id. at 1517.
103. Id. Changing pressures from the storage and escape of gas in and from the Bartlesville formation affected activity in the Squirrel formation because the two formations were in
.pressure communication." Id. High pressure created by WNG's gas storage inhibited oil
production and created safety hazards. Phillip E. DeLaTorre, Survey of Kansas Oil and Gas
Law (1988-1992), 41 KAN. L. REv. 691, 719 n.203 (1993). WNG's gas rendered nine out of
ten of Reese's wells non-producing. Reese, 983 F.2d at 1517.
WNG attempted to mitigate the damage loss of gas with a compressor which captured
the gas in the Squirrel formation and returned it to the Bartlesville formation. On one occasion, the compressor failed and caused Reese's lead line to "blow out." As a result, twenty
acres were soaked with oil and salt water. Id.
104. A recent case decided by the Kansas Supreme Court applied the rule of capture to
gas storage. Anderson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 699 P.2d.1023 (Kan. 1985). The Anderson court
held that an owner of natural gas lost its tide when it injected non-native gas into the underground area and the gas was then produced from the common reservoir (limiting the holding to situations where the landowner is not a public utility and has stored natural gas under
the property of an adjoining land owner without permission). Id. See also TanyaJ. Treadway,
Note, Oil & Gas Law: The Rule of Capture Applied to the UndergroundStorage of Natural Gas Anderson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 34 KAN. L. Rav. 801 (1986) (arguing that the Anderson
court should have based its decision on a theory of trespass rather than quiet tide).
105. Reese, 983 F.2d at 1517.
106. Id.
107. Reese Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 768 F. Supp. 1416, 1425 (D.
Kan. 1991).
108. Id.
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under its respective lease. 1° g Furthermore, because WNG had elected to
utilize only the Bartlesville formation for storage, it could not now enlarge
its storage rights to other formations. 110 However, the court ruled against
Reese's claim for ownership finding that although gas had escaped, WNG
never lost ownership.'11
c.

Tenth Circuit Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court holding that WNG retained title to the non-native gas produced by Reese from the Squirrel
formation, 112 but it reversed the lower court on the negligence issue,
holding that WNG was not responsible to Reese for the damage caused by
1
the escaping gas. 3
In finding that the escaped gas was not subject to the law of capture
under Kansas law, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the Kansas' Supreme
Court's holding in Anderson. 1 4 According to the court, the situation in
Reese was easily distinguishable from Anderson because: 1) in the present
case the gas migrated vertically, whereas in Anderson, the gas migrated
horizontally through the same formation to different lands; 115 2) WNG
l6
had a contractual authorization to store gas in the Squirrel formation;"
117
and 3) WNG was a natural gas public utility permitted by FERC.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's holding that WNG was
negligent. The court explained that negligence can be found only if a
corresponding duty is imposed on the allegedly negligent party. The issue
in Reese was whether a duty was imposed on WNG in the assignment of its
storage rights not to interfere with Reese's oil production. 118 The court
resolved this issue by interpreting the express language of the parties' assignment contracts. The grant to WNG's predecessor conveyed the right
to store gas in all underground formations above 1,050 feet without any
reservations. Meanwhile, the assignment to Reese's predecessor was ex109. Id. at 1423.
110. Id. at 1424. The court analogized WNG's rights to an easement in which a party's
actions define the scope and location of the easement. In other words, because WNG had
only utilized the Bartlesville formation for storage, its rights to store were now limited to that
area. Id.
111. Id. at 1427.
112. Reese Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 983 F.2d 1514, 1523 (10th Cir.
1993).
113. Id. at 1522.
114. Id. at 1523. For a description of the Anderson holding, see supra note 104.
115. The situation in Reese was unusual because the two interest owners' tracts were located on top of one another and the gas migrated vertically. Typically, the applicability of
the law of capture arises when the parties' tracts are adjacent and the migration is horizontal.
The district court reasoned, without sufficient explanation, that the direction of the migration assisted in distinguishing Reese from Anderson. Reese, 768 F. Supp. at 1427. The Tenth
Circuit merely adopted the lower court's distinction. Rees, 983 F.2d at 1523. See DeLaTorre,
supra note 103, at 720 (criticizing the lower court's distinction of horizontal and vertical
movement in determining whether or not to apply the rule because Kansas "recognizes horizontal, as well as vertical, severance of rights").
116. Reese, 983 F.2d at 1523.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1521.
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plicitly made subject to the gas storage rights assigned to WNG. 119 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that Reese owed a duty not to interfere with
120
WNG's gas storage activities, but the duty was not reciprocal.
3.

Analysis

Several different causes of action may give rise to a capture analysis.
Attempts to store gas which migrates to adjoining land owners' property
may result in trespass actions by the land owner. 121 If the court adheres to
the law of capture, the gas owner is not liable for trespass because the gas
owner is deemed to have lost title upon injection or migration.
Rather than sue for damages under trespass, adjoining surface or
mineral owners may seek a declaratory judgment that the injector lost possession of or title to the stored gas.' 22 Applying the law of capture here
would result in a transfer of ownership. Likewise, the gas injector would
lose the rights to the gas and the extractor would become the new owner.
Finally, gas injected may cause damage to a neighboring interest owner,
causing the affected party to sue for negligence.
Reese sued for ownership and negligence. Theoretically, under the
law of capture, ownership is either lost upon injection or upon escape
from the storage formation; therefore, the previous owner cannot be held
liable for damage caused by the gas.123 For example, if the Tenth Circuit
had applied the law of capture in Reese, WNG would have been deemed to
have lost title to the gas and therefore may not have been liable for damages suffered by Reese. However, Reese would have gained or had the
opportunity to gain possession of the gas. On the other hand, without the
law of capture, WNG retained ownership, thereby subjecting itself to possible liability for the damage caused by the gas.
A negligence claim against WNG failed because the conveyances of
the respective interests designated Reese's interest as servient or subject to
WNG's. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit rejected Reese's negligence claim.
This demonstrates that contract rights may define duties which control
common law negligence. In other words, private agreements, such as
leases and assignments of mineral interests, can determine whether common law tort actions apply. Even though Reese suffered damage from the
presence of WNG's gas, Reese could find no remedy in court. 12 4 In creating and purchasing leases and assignments, parties should be aware of
such agreements impact on the common law, particularly negligence.
119. Id. at 1521-22.

120. Id. at 1522.
121. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934).
122. See, e.g., Bezzi v. Hocker, 370 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1966).
123. This is not to say that one cannot be negligent in attempting to store or recover the

gas.
124. The court noted that WNG's conduct may have been limited by the doctrine of

implied covenants or by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1203 (1983), which allows the appropriation of
subsurface formations for gas storage, but requires that the appropriation be without prejudice to other rights or interests. The Tenth Circuit, however, did not decide these issues
because they were not raised by the parties. Reese, 983. F.2d at 1523, n.8.
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Although Reese's case engenders sympathy, Reese knew gas was being
injected at the location when it took the assignment. Reese's best option
now is to enter into a contractual relationship with WNG to remedy or
mitigate the situation if it is economically prudent to continue
production.125
II.

A.

PUBLIC LANDS

Public Participationin the Bureau of Land Management's Planningand
Land Transfer Procedures: National Parks and Conservation
26
Ass'n v. Federal Aviation Administration
1. Background

In the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA), 127 Congress directed the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) 1 2 8 to undertake formal, comprehensive planning for the 448 million acres of land within its jurisdiction.1 29 Although many of FLPMA's
directives are vague and ambiguous, 130 the provisions regarding protec125. As a result of the court's ruling, WNG now possesses superior negotiating leverage.
Reese would likely have to pay great consideration to convince WNG to alter its conduct.
126. 998 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1993).
127. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988). FLPMA covers areas of public land administration
that fall beyond the scope of this article. This section will focus on subchapter I of FLPMA
(General Provisions) and parts of subchapter II (Land Use Planning and Land Acquisition
and Disposition). Subchapter III specifically addresses administration; subchapter IV authorizes the Secretary of Interior to issue permits and leases for domestic livestock grazing; subchapter V provides for the grants of rights-of-way; and subchapter VI discusses reviewing
particular tracts for designation as wilderness areas. See Robert L. Glicksman, Severability and
the Realignment of the Balance of Power Over the Public Lands: The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 After the Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGs LJ. 1, 6-7 (1984).
128. The BLM is an agency of the Department of the Interior. For purposes of this article, "public land(s)" refer only to the lands governed by the BLM.
In total, the federal government owns about one-third of the country's on-shore surface
land, totaling 730 million out of 2.3 billion acres which comprise the United States. JAN G.
LArros &JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAw 64 (1992). See also GEORGE
CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAw 14 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter COGINS ET. ALI (indicating how much land in each state is owned by the federal
government).
129. Prior to FLPMA, the BLM had commenced formal land planning pursuant to the
1964 Classification and Multiple Use Act (CMUA). 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (expired 1970).
130. FLPMA is widely criticized for its vagueness and generalities. See George Cameron
Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planningon the FederalLands, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 307,
319 (1990) [hereinafter Coggins] (although § 1712 mandates planning, it otherwise is openended; "it specifies neither schedules, procedures, nor content of land use plans, leaving
most methods and details to secretarial discretion"); id. at 308 ("Congress neglected to spell
out anything except vague generalities to guide the BLM"); Lisa J. Hudson,JudicialReview of
Bureau of Land Management's Land Use Plans Under the Federal Rangeland Statutes, 8 PuB. LAND
L. REv. 185, 189 (1987) ("Congress failed to resolve adequately basic management conflicts
or translate underlying principles into binding commands" and "failed to ensure that the
planning process would be implemented fully and neglected to define precise standards").
In addition to ambiguities within the statute, Coggins attributes BLM's inconsistent planning to budget constraints and other statutes imposing ad hoc planning requirements on the
BLM. Coggins, supra note 130, at 316-17.
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tion for designated areas of critical environmental concern (ACEC)' 3 1
and public participation in the planning process are particularly clear.
Generally, FLPMA embodies the basic philosophies of land use planning, multiple use, and sustained yield.13 2 FLPMA grants the agency flexibility in allocating resources rather than forcing the BLM to devote any
133
particular tract of public land to a specific use.
Planning under FLPMA begins with an inventory of all public lands,
their resources, and values.13 4 FLPMA § 1712(a) 1 3 5 commands the BLM
36
to create formal land use plans, based in part on the inventories taken.'
13 7
These plans are legally binding on the BLM,
and agency decisions regarding the management of public lands must be "in accordance" with
such plans.' 38 Therefore, the BLM is theoretically committed to a ra39
tional, coordinated management scheme.'
131. An Area of Critical Environmental Concern (ACEC) is an area within the public
lands where special management attention is required to "protect and prevent irreparable
damage to important historic, cultural, or scenic values, fish and wildlife resources or other
natural systems or processes, or to protect life and safety from natural hazards." 43 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a) (1988). The corresponding regulation uses the same definition of ACEC, except it
adds that the identification of a potential ACEC "shall not, of itself, change or prevent
change of the management or use of public lands." 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(a) (1993).
ACECs are supposed to be unique areas of national significance deserving protection in
their natural state. The ACEC designation is not intended to halt all development. Gail L.
Achterman et al., "NFMA and FLPMA: Fifteen Years of Planning," Public Land Law, Paper No.
5, 5-27 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1992) (citing S. Rep. No. 94-583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 43
(1976)).
132. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a) (7) & 1712(c) (1) (1988). These philosophies, along with much
of the language in FLPMA, were borrowed from the 1960 Multiple Use, Sustained-Yield Act
(MUSYA). 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988). See Hudson, supra note 130, at 188-89 (explaining
that while much of the language in FLPMA was borrowed from the MUSYA applicable to the
Forest Service's management of the national forests, the two statutes are different in that the
management directives in FLPMA are couched in mandatory language). See also COGGINS ET
AL., supra note 128, at 622-23 (providing a summary of MUSYA).
133. See generally Maria E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons from Public Land
Law, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 43 (1991). See also COocINS Er AL., supra note 128, at 14 (noting that
the basic public land legal conflicts are over use of public resources).
134.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (1988). The section includes identifiable values but does
not limit them to outdoor recreation and scenic values. Additionally, the inventory is to be
kept current to reflect changes in conditions and to identify new and emerging resource and
other values. Id.
135. "The Secretary shall, with public involvement.., develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of the public
lands." 42 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1988).
136. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (c)(4) (1988). The command to plan embodied in the section
is unspecific so as to leave room for agency discretion. See Coggins, supra note 130, at 319.
"It is not realistic to expect or require that plans be so specific that they eliminate managerial
discretion." On the other hand, under a broad mandate such as this, the agency may "promulgate plans so general as to be meaningless as limitations on or guidelines for subsequent
management decisions." Id. at 309.
137.
See Coggins, supra note 130, at 309.
138. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1988).
139. Hudson, supra note 130, at 188. Realistically, BLM planning has been hampered by
a chronic shortage of resources, personnel, and expertise and by changes in policy direction.
Coggins, supra note 130, at 318 & n.104. In addition, BLM maintains a low planning budget.
Id. at 320. As a result, BLM's planning efforts are "criticized as tardy, inconsistent, and generally inadequate." Id. at 318.
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FLPMA sets forth substantive criteria that the BLM must consider in
the development and revision of land use plans. 140 The BLM shall: observe the principles of multiple use and sustained yield; give priority in
protection to Areas of Critical Environmental Concern; rely on the inventory of the lands; consider present and potential uses; consider the scarcity
of values and the availability of alternatives; weigh the long-term against
the short-term benefits; provide for compliance with applicable pollution
141
control laws; and coordinate with other states and other agencies.
In addition to ACECs' role as substantive criteria for the adoption of
land use plans, 142 ACECs are mentioned in § 1711 (a) of FLPMA, regarding the BLM's land inventories. 143 Section 1711(a) by itself does not
change management standards for land designated as an ACEC. 144 Section 1712, however, specifies that the resource inventory required under
§ 1711(a) including ACEC identification, serves as the foundation for the
land use plan. 145 The two sections read together indicate that Congress
146
intended more than cursory consideration of ACECs.
Although FLPMA contains few procedural requirements, 147 it clearly
reflects congressional sentiment regarding the importance of including
the public in land use decisions. FLPMA was enacted largely in response
to a shift in public sentiment regarding public land use from favoring disposition to favoring conservation. 148 Congress recognized the public's
growing discontent and resolved to retain the remaining public domain in
federal ownership 149 and to manage the lands to avoid "unnecessary or
140. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (1988).
141. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (1),(3)-(9) (1988). Coggins notes that"[e]ven though Congress
phrased each mandatorily, the criteria are remarkable for their lack of specificity." Only the
mandates requiring designation and protection of ACECs and compliance with applicable
pollution control laws are definite, applicable standards. Coggins, supra note 130, at 321.
142. Section 1712(c) (3) provides that in the development and revision of land use plans,
"the Secretary shall . . . give priority to the designation and protection of areas of critical
environmental concern."
143. Section 1711 (a) provides that "the Secretary shall prepare and maintain . . . an
inventory of all public lands . .. giving priority to areas of critical environmental concern."
144. Coggins, supra note 130, at 319.
145. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(4) (1988).
146. See Coggins, supra note 130, at 321-22 (predicting that any challenges to a plan based
on the Secretary's statutory requirements to give priority to ACEC designations would "face
uphill battles").
147. Coggins points out that FLPMA specifies only two mandatory procedural requirements: public participation and the use of a "systematic interdisciplinary approach to
achieve integrated consideration of physical, biological, economic, and other sciences." Id.
at 320 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (c)(2) (1988)).
148. Achterman et al., supra note 131, at 5-2. FLPMA also sought to remedy wide-spread
over-grazing on public lands, among other problems. LArros & TOMAIN, supra note 128, at
95.
Because FLPMA embodies the multiple use philosophy, the BLM must also consider and
fulfill "demands for recreation, minerals, forage, timber, and other resources and activities"
in addition to considering conservation interests. Maria E. Mansfield, The "Public" in Public
Land Appeals: A Case Study in "Reformed"AdministrativeLaw and ProposalforOrderly Participation,
12 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 465 (1988) (examining BLM procedural rules to discuss public
participation in public land management).
149. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1988).
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undue degradation." 150 ACEC designation and public participation are
two tools enabling FLPMA to achieve its objectives.
FLPMA and the BLM's FLPMA regulations embrace the public participation concept.15 I FLPMA provides for public participation twice within
§ 1712 regarding the development of land use plans. First, "public involvement" is required in developing, maintaining and revising land use
plans. 15 2 Second, FLPMA requires the Secretary to adopt procedures,
15
including public hearings, to act as a vehicle for public participation.
The BLM regulations also contain numerous provisions regarding
public participation. The regulations require public involvement in planning at the beginning of the process,1 5 4 throughout a plan's development,
and during its adoption, revision, or amendment.' 55 Despite the pervasive
existence of mandatory public participation provisions in both FLPMA
1 56
and the regulations, the BLM has attempted to plan without the public.
2.

Tenth Circuit Opinion

In National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. FederalAviation Administration,1 57 the Tenth Circuit recognized the public's right to participate in
actions affecting public lands. The court held that the BLM neglected to
meet its statutorily prescribed duty to provide adequate notice prior to
5 8
amending a land plan and transferring land within its jurisdiction.1
a. Facts
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved and provided
funding for construction of an airport in San Juan County, Utah.' 59 The
150. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1988); 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-8 (1993).
151. Public involvement is generally defined as "the opportunity for participation by affected citizens in rulemaking, decisionmaking, and planning with respect to the public lands,
including public meetings or hearings at locations near the affected lands, or advisory mechanisms, or other such procedures as may be required in particular instances. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1702(d) (1988).
152. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1988).
153. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(f) (1988):
The Secretary shall allow an opportunity for public involvement and by regulation
shall establish procedures, including public hearings where appropriate, to give
Federal, State, and local governments and the public, adequate notice and opportunity to comment upon and participate in the formulation of plans and programs
relating to the management of the public lands.
154. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.2 (c), (f)(1); 1610.4-1 (1993).
155. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.2 (a), (c), (f)(2-5); 1610.5-5 (1993) (requiring participation in
amending a plan); Id § 1610.4-2 (in reviewing the proposed planning criteria); Id § 1610.51(b) (in publication of the proposed resource management plan and proposed and final
environmental impact statement (EIS) and in any significant change made to the plan as a
result of action on protest).
156. See Coggins, supra note 130, at 320 & n.l 19 (citing National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C.Cir. 1987), rev'd, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
granted sub norm.,
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990); Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal. 1985)).
157. 998 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1993).
158. Id at 1531.
159. Id. at 1526.
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site FAA selected encompassed public land administered by the BLM 16 °
pursuant to FLPMA. 16 1 The BLM had designated a portion of the land as
an ACEC by a 1989 Proposed Resource Management Plan (RMP). 162 The
proposed RMP provided ACEC protection for corridors on both sides of
163
Utah Highway U-276, which subsequently included the airport site.
The RMP also contained a ban on the transfer of federal ownership of the
land. 16 4

In order to convey the tract, the BLM had to amend the RMP, which
according to the court, required compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 1 65 The FAA issued a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) on January 17, 1990 in which the final
airport site was identified for the first time. This was also the first form of
notice to the public indicating that the BLM was transferring the land
rather than moving forward with the proposed RMP. 166 Although the
BLM and the FAA had been discussing the transfer for some time prior to
the issuance of the DEIS, the public believed that the BLM intended to
protect the area.1 67 The National Parks & Conservation Association
(NPCA) requested a stay of the construction and sought review of the
BLM's decision to amend the land plan to convey public land to the FAA
for construction of the airport. Specifically, NPCA argued that the BLM
violated FLPMA by failing to give notice of the land plan amendment and
by not providing a rational assessment of the effect of the conveyance on
the existing land plans. Furthermore, NPCA alleged that the BLM's rever160. Id. at 1525.
161. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 to 1784 (1988).
162. See generally 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.1 - 1610.8 (1993). A Resource Management Plan is a
land use plan as described by FLPMA. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(k) (1993). It should establish:
land areas for exclusive or limited use (including ACEC designation); allowable resource uses
and levels of production to be maintained; resource condition goals; program constraints
and necessary management practices; areas to be covered by more specific plans; support
action; implementation sequences; and standards for monitoring and evaluating the plan.
See 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5 (k)(1)-(8); NationalParks, 998 F.2d at 1525 n.7.

The BLM also governed the site according to the 1973 Management Framework Plan
(MFP). Id. at 1525. MFPs differ in both procedure and content from RMPs prepared under
FLPMA. Coggins, supra note 130, at 317. A MFP provides step-by-step instructions as to the
management of a particular public land resource area. Each individual management decision is listed along with the action required to achieve the decision and the supporting rationale. NationalParks, 998 F.2d at 1525-26 n.8. The MFPs remain in force until superseded
by RMPs, but the BLM has been slow to make the transition and to promulgate RMPs. See
Goggins, supra note 130, at 317 & n.93.

163. National Parks, 998 F.2d at 1525-26.
164. Id. at 1529.
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370a (1988). NEPA requires an EIS for all "major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id. § 4332(C) (1988).

An EIS enables federal administrators to consider the consequences of their actions
before acting. In an EIS, adequate consideration must be given to reasonable alternatives to
the proposed action. The statute, however, does not impose an obligation on the agency to

follow any course of action. ElSs have been controversial due to the additional transaction
costs incurred in developing them and the litigation they have spurred. See COGGINS ET AL.,
supra note 128, at 335.
166. NationalParks, 998 F.2d at 1530-31.
167. 998 F.2d at 1530. In fact, in April 1989, the BLM reissued the proposed RMP with
the ACEC designation and ban on transfer still included. Id.
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sal of its position with respect to the Scenic Corridor ACEC was arbitrary
168
and capricious.
The BLM 169 responded that the EIS conducted by the FAA sufficiently met the BLM's requirements under FLPMA and that because the
1989 RMP was only a proposal, the change in designation of land was not
170
an arbitrary and capricious action.
3.

Holding

The Tenth Circuit denied NPCA's request for a stay of the construction of the airport, 17 1 but the court held that the BLM violated the specific
requirements of NEPA and FLPMA. The BLM failed to provide the public2
17
with notice of its actions so that public participation could take place.
Based on the chronology of events leading to the transfer of BLM land, it
173
was apparent to the court that the notice given was "far from adequate."
Specifically, the BLM violated its own regulation that notice be provided at
the "outset of the planning process." 174 The court reversed and remanded because it was unclear whether the BLM would have reached the
same decision if public involvement had been present from the beginning
175
of the process.
4.

Analysis

In NationalParks, the Tenth Circuit applied the brakes to the BLM's
fast and loose rulemaking by holding that the BLM's public notice of the
plan amendment and land transfer was inadequate. Given the complexity
of the BLM'sjob in developing plans for vast amounts of land and its tight
budget, thejoint effort between the BLM and the FAA in providing a DEIS
was reasonable. 176 The BLM's reliance on other agencies to provide notice of its own actions, however, was not acceptable.
168. Id at 1526. The NPCA also sought review of the FAA's determination that the noise
impact of the airport would have "no significant impact" on the adjacent Glen Canyon Na-

tional Recreation Area. The NPCA specifically alleged that the FAA ignored relevant studies
on noise impact and failed to consider relevant factors in determining noise impacts. Id
The court agreed, concluding that the FAA's approval of the airport project, based on a
finding of"no significant impact," was arbitrary and capricious. It explained that the decision
to reverse and remand FAA's finding of no significant impact would not be meaningless even
though the airport had already been built. On remand, the FAA may determine that it must
make use of studies not utilized in the EIS. If the agency then finds a "significant impact," it
would be required to mitigate the damage. Id. at 1533-34.
169. Other respondents included the FAA, the Department of Transportation, and the
Department of the Interior. Id. at 1523.
170. Id. at 1526.
171. Id. at 1525 n.3.
172. Id. at 1531.
173. Id.
174. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.4-1 (1993).
175. National Parks, 998 F.2d at 1533. The court remanded to determine whether the
land should be retained under BLM control and management or transferred to the FAA. Id.
176. The court did not address whether the BLM was required to furnish its own EIS for
amending the plan. Agencies may be exempt from NEPA obligations when there is a direct
statutory conflict with the agency's enabling legislation, if the agency action pursuant to an
environmental statute is the functional equivalent of NEPA review, or if the agency's statutory
duties further NEPA's purposes. LArros & TOMAIN, supra note 128, at 242-43.
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Public participation is obviously thwarted by inadequate notice.
FLPMA clearly announces Congress' intent that the public stay abreast of
the BLM's planning activities. Similar sentiment was reflected in the
BLM's own regulations. Due to the pervasiveness of concern for public
,involvement embodied in the statute, it is unlikely the courts will overlook
omissions by the BLM in this area.
Although the Tenth Circuit prevented the BLM from disregarding
FLPMA mandates by supporting an important procedural aspect of the
statute, the court failed to give FLPMA substantive meaning regarding
ACECs.' 77 As noted earlier in this survey, many of FLPMA's substantive
provisions are vague. 178 The provision regarding ACEC designation, however, is not. Congress intended that ACEC designation attach if the land is
nationally significant and deserving of protection in its natural condition.
It is unlikely that Congress intended ACEC designation to be disregarded
by the BLM upon receiving an offer to purchase. Judicial enforcement of
ACECs and other substantive FLPMA provisions would give the BLM incentive to provide coherent and consistent land plans. The Tenth Circuit
had the opportunity in National Parks, but failed to give import to the
BLM's ACEC designation.
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit unwisely denied NPCA's request for a
stay of the construction of the airport, which was completed prior to the
issuance of this decision. 179 Although the court held that the BLM did
not follow FLPMA's procedural mandates regarding public involvement,
the holding merely provided a post hoc reprimand of the BLM's conduct.
Because public involvement is an essential procedural element of FLPMA,
an injunction would not have been an unreasonable remedy.' 80
In actions alleging NEPA violations, courts may grant plaintiffs preliminary injunctions against projects in their early stages.' 81 Under such
circumstances, the agency generally is required to remedy procedural deficiencies by either preparing an EIS or correcting an inadequate one
before resuming work on the project.' 8 2 Similarly, the court could have
halted construction of the airport to allow the BLM to correct its omission
and comply with the statute.
The court explained that even though the airport had been built, the
remand was not meaningless because mitigation measures could still be
The BLM attempted to eschew NEPA in early planning efforts. See National Resources
Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 841-42 (D. D.C. 1974), affd per curiam, 527 F.2d
1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976) (rejecting the BLM's argument that a
programmatic environmental impact statement would suffice to assess all BLM grazing programs and ordering the agency to prepare 145 district-specific EISs by 1988).
177. Courts have historically avoided substantive FLPMA review. See Coggins, supra note
130, at 326.
178. See supra part III.A.
179. National Parks, 998 F.2d at 1525 n.3.
180. The court noted the seriousness of the BLM's failure to notify the public when it
pointed out that the agency may not have made the same decision to convey the land to the
FAA "if active public involvement [were] present from the beginning of the process." Id. at
1533.
181. See Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1975).
182. JAN G. LArros, NATURAL RESOURCES LAw 112 (1985).
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implemented. Regardless of public sentiment regarding the use of the
land, this provides little consolation for the court's disregard of the public's statutory right to participate in the BLM's use designation of the "public" land.
CONCLUSION

A substantial number of oil and gas cases are resolved by judicial interpretation of the underlying agreements. In Amoco, the Tenth Circuit
interpreted a gas marketing clause in a unit operating agreement to allow
the working interest owners to share the proceeds of gas sales. In Reese,
the Tenth Circuit found that the underlying assignments controlled the
parties respective duties and held the owner of escaping gas was not liable
for damage it caused. Together, Amoco and Reese demonstrate an inconsistency in the court's degree of judicial activism in interpreting private oil
and gas agreements. Finally, in the area of public lands, in NationalParks,
the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of public participation in the BLM's planning process. Although the court could have prevented the BLM from
conveying public land without public involvement by granting an injunction, the National Parks decision nonetheless, sent a powerful message to
the agency regarding the importance of public participation.
Cristyn Eddy

